Monday's class was on Tarski's "Semantic Conception of Truth", which is what Burton Dreben used to call one of Tarski's "popularizations" and refused to take seriously. I like it for teaching, because it gives a nice introduction to Tarski's approach to the liar and to truth generally.
I felt like I fell a bit more into lecturing on this paper than on the others we've discussed. Maybe that was because it's more technical in nature, and I thought there was just stuff people needed to know. For example, Tarski indicates but does not actually argue that satisfaction of Convention T guarantees the extensional correctness of the defined truth-predicate. We needed to see why that is.
Still, the class was a lesson in how easy it is to fall back into talking a lot, something I'll try to avoid in our future sessions.
Today, then, is Dummett's "Truth". It seems, from the written responses I got from the students, as if my detailed reading notes did help. I was very impressed, in fact, with how well they'd done with this difficult paper. We'll see how the discussion goes.